During the last years, there has been an important discussion on the concept of mental disorder. Several accounts of such a concept have been offered by theorists, although neither of these accounts seems to have successfully answered both the question of what it means for a certain mental condition to be a disorder and the question of what it means for a certain disorder to be mental. In this paper, I propose an account of the (...) concept of mental disorder that, if I am right, provides satisfactory answers to both of these questions. Furthermore, this account (unlike other accounts presented in the literature on the subject) meets the requirements for achieving a crucial goal underlying the project of sorting out the concept of mental disorder, namely the goal of allowing the existence of a dialogue between mental health professionals of different theoretical orientations. To achieve this goal, the account herein proposed is not based in any particular theoretical framework, but in both ordinary and technical theory-neutral concepts. In the last part of the paper, I argue that it follows from most accounts of the concept of mental disorder that the disciplines concerned with explaining some mental disorders are not branches of medicine, and that the treatment of some mental disorders is not a matter of medical intervention. (shrink)

The paper develops a framework for discussing concepts of health and disease along two dimensions. The first is the role of values in our disease concepts, and the second is the relationship between science and folk psychology. This framework is then applied to the concept of mental disorder. I argue that existing treatments of the concept yield too much authority to common sense, which produces a tension within the program of finding a scientific basis for our (...) ascriptions of mental disorder. The science should be given more authority, even if this leads to counterintuitive results. I conclude by identifying several smaller scale conceptual problems within the application of science to mental illness, and argue that the debate needs to shift towards dealing with such problems in an empirically informed way, rather than remaining at the level of conceptual analysis. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy of health has been quite focused on the problem of determining the nature of the concepts of health, illness and disease from a scientific point of view. Some theorists claim and argue that these concepts are value-free and descriptive in the same sense as the concepts of atom, metal and rain are value-free and descriptive. To say that a person has a certain disease or that he or she is unhealthy is thus to objectively describe this (...) person. On the other hand it certainly does not preclude an additional evaluation of the state of affairs as undesirable or bad. The basic scientific description and the evaluation are, however, two independent matters, according to this kind of theory. Other philosophers claim that the concept of health, together with the other medical concepts, is essentially value-laden. To establish that a person is healthy does not just entail some objective inspection and measurement. It presupposes also an evaluation of the general state of the person. A statement that he or she is healthy does not merely imply certain scientific facts regarding the person’s body or mind but implies also a (positive) evaluation of the person’s bodily and mental state. My task in this paper will be, first, to present the two principal rival types of theories and present what I take to be the main kind of reasoning by which we could assess these theories, and second, to present a deeper characterization of the principal rival theories of health and illness. (shrink)

Russell Powell and Eric Scarffe1 are pluralists about disease. They offer their thickly normative account to meet the needs of doctors, but they allow that a different concept of disease might work better for zoologists. In this commentary, I grant that Powell and Scarffe’s thickly normative evaluation of biological dysfunction works well in many medicinal contexts. Powell and Scarffe respond effectively to eliminativists—we should retain the concept of disease. But the paper’s pluralism and focus on the specific needs (...) of institutions should permit us to eliminate the notion of disease from domains for which the historical grounding of their selected effects account of function are contrary to therapeutic goals. One such domain is mental health. I found Powell and Scarffe’s rejection of Boorse’s dispositional account of biological function persuasive—the selected effects account of function is a superior fit for biologists’ use of the term. But the historical nature of this concept is, at best, a distraction from the task of morally evaluating the many ways in which …. (shrink)

Examining the naturalist and normativist concepts of health and disease this article starts with analysing the view of C. Boorse. It rejects Boorse's account of health as species-typical functioning, giving a critique of his view based on evolutionary theory of contemporary biology. Then it gives a short overview of the normativist theories of health, which can be objectivist and subjectivist theories. Rejecting the objectivist theories as philosophically untenable, it turns to the subjectivist theories of Gert and Culver, (...) and to the view of Nordenfelt. These theories give quite a good subjectivist account of health and disease, but they do not pay enough attention to the notion of the environment, without which it is impossible to define health and disease. Starting with their definitions but introducing the notion of “reasonable social norms”, the article arrives at the following definition of health: The healthier a physical or mental characteristic, process, reaction is, the more it makes it possible for the individual to adapt to reasonable social norms without pain and suffering, and the longer, and happier a life it will be able to ensure him in that society. (shrink)

By examining an exemplar sample of mental health nursing educational policies and related legislation, in this article, we trace the discursive production of madness as an “othered” identity category. We engage in a critical discourse analysis of mental health nursing education in Canada, drawing on provincial and federal policies and legislation as the main sources of data. Theoretically framed by critical posthumanism and mad studies, this article outlines how the mad subjectivity becomes decontextualized out of its (...) identity‐based understanding and recontextualized as an inferior category of “the human,” circulating within discourses of pedagogy, economics, law, and psychiatry. The article maps the intertextual nexus of the discourse of mental health nursing education, making visible the complex, the arbitrary, and the sometimes‐contradictory nature of the discipline's grappling with identity‐based mental health concepts. We close with several implications for nursing policy, education, and practice. (shrink)

Although considerable attention has been devoted to the concepts of “visible” and “invisible” victims in general medical practice, especially in relation to resource allocation, far less consideration has been devoted to these concepts in behavioral health. Distinctive features of mental health care in the United States help explain this gap. This essay explores three specific ways in which the American mental health care system protects potentially “visible” individuals at the expense of “invisible victims” and otherwise (...) fails to meet the needs of great numbers of people with serious psychiatric conditions: prioritization of the wrong patients, incentivization of excessive caution among providers, and a narrow definition of psychiatry's purview. While each of these practices has been discussed elsewhere in the literature, they are rarely considered as part of an interrelated and systemic problem. Reconceptualizing these three issues as aspects of the larger conflict between the interests of “visible” and “invisible” victims may prove a path toward reform. (shrink)

(1992). The agonic and hedonic modes: Definition, usage, and the promotion of mental health. World Futures: Vol. 35, Socio-Mental Bimodality, pp. 87-113.

Global Mental Health is a field of research and practice that addresses the expansion of universal and equitable mental health care worldwide. This article explores the ways the concept of culture is employed in Global Mental Health literature. Global Mental Health advocates and critics assume an ontological separation between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ to typify mental illness, linking it predominantly to one or the other of these two categories. Advocates of Global (...) Mental Health view mental disorders as a nature–culture hybrid, while critics see them as typically cultural phenomena. The cultural critique of Global Mental Health can be strengthened by a sociological approach to both the role of critique and the uses of the concept of culture within social sciences. As an alternative to the ontologization of culture, we propose a different theoretical approach to the social issues involved in the expansion of international public health care in mental health: Arthur Kleinman's and Didier Fassin’s moral anthropological approaches. (shrink)

The principle of solidarity is one of the fundamental legal principles applied in the field of health care regulation. This article analyses EU and Lithuanian legal acts, judicial practice, the doctrine of law and foreign scientific resources in order to reveal the content of solidarity principle and to discuss its role in the legal regulation of health care both at EU and national levels. The article is divided into three parts. The first part of the paper examines the (...) correlation between the right to health established in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) and the principle of solidarity as the fundamental value upon which the EU is ‘founded’ and which it seeks to ‘preserve and develop’, as the preamble to the Charter states. It is noticed that the principle of solidarity is one of the principles which characterize the European law on social protection. In the summary of the findings of the article, the author states that this principle can be considered as a tool to achieve a greater social cohesion within the EU Member States in defining and implementing all policies and activities in order to ensure a high level of human physical, mental and social health protection through, first of all, a reduction of health care inequalities. For that it is necessary to tackle the factors which determine health care inequalities among the EU Member States. (shrink)

In recent years there has been considerable discussion and controversy concerning the concepts of mental health and mental illness. The controversy has centered around the problem of providing criteria for an adequate conception of mental health and illness, as well as difficulties in specifying a clear and workable system for the classification, understanding, and treatment of psychological and emotional disorders. In this paper I shall examine a cluster of these complex and important issues, focusing on (...) attempts to define ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’; diverse factors influencing the ascription of the predicates ‘is mentally ill’ and ‘is mentally healthy’; and some specific problems concerning these concepts as they appear in various theories of psychopathology. The approach here will be in the nature of a survey, directed at the specification of a number of problems—conceptual, methodological, and pragmatic—as they arise in various attempts to define and to provide criteria for applying the concepts of mental health and mental illness. (shrink)

The involuntary admission or treatment of a mentally ill individual is highly controversial, as it may be argued that such intervention infringes on individual autonomy and the right to choose a particular treatment. However, this argument must be balanced with the need to provide immediate healthcare services to a vulnerable person who cannot or will not make a choice in his or her own best interests at a particular time. A study carried out in Gauteng Province, South Africa, highlighted the (...) fact that the annual rate of involuntary admissions increased by almost double from 2007 to 2008. This could indicate that healthcare providers are not treating patients without their consent only when this is absolutely necessary. Alternatively, it could indicate that healthcare professionals are more aware of the provisions of the Mental Health Care Act and relevant national policy guidelines. Or it could suggest that more patients are presenting with mental illnesses or disorders that require their involuntary admission. It remains for strategies to be developed that change negative perceptions and inequities for individuals with mental illness. Above all, the strategies should be underpinned by inalienable respect for mentally ill individuals – a concept that was blatantly disregarded in the Life Esidimeni case. In this article, we highlight the functions of mental health review boards and their accountability where involuntary admissions are concerned, while emphasising the protections for mentally ill persons as a vulnerable population group, as set out in the SA Constitution. (shrink)

The purpose is to solve the problem that the current research on the impact of the microstructure of mental elasticity and its constituent factors on the development of the mental elasticity of children is not comprehensive, and the traditional artificial analysis method of mental problems has strong subjectivity and low accuracy. First, the structural equation model is used to study the microstructure of poor children's mental elasticity, and to explore the structural relationship and functional path between (...) the mental elasticity of children and the self-efficacy of their mental health, psychological anxiety, and attachment. Second, a prediction model of mental problems of children in plight based on the backpropagation neural network is constructed. Finally, middle schools in the representative areas of Northwest China are selected as the research unit. The relevant research data are collected by issuing questionnaires, and the data set is constructed to verify the performance of the model. The experimental results show that the average prediction errors of the BPNN model and the support vector regression model are 1.87 and 5.4, respectively. The error of BPNN is 65.4% lower than that of SVR, so BPNN has a better performance. The prediction results of the test set show that the actual error and the relative error of the BPNN model are controlled in the range of 0.01, and the prediction accuracy is high. The structural equation model has a high fitting degree. The results of the questionnaire analysis show that attachment, self-efficacy, and psychological anxiety exert a significant direct impact on mental elasticity. This exploration aims to conduct a micro investigation on the relationship among the three core variables in the resilience research of children in plight, and analyze their resilience, to provide a theoretical basis for the resilience intervention design of vulnerable groups. (shrink)

Often drawing on the phenomenological tradition, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists working in the field of “embodied cognition” subscribe to the general view that cognition is grounded in aspects of its sensorimotor embodiment and should be comprehended as the result of a dynamic interaction of nonneural and neural processes. After a brief introduction, the paper critically engages Lakoff and Johnson’s “conceptual metaphor theory”, and provides a review of recent empirical evidence that appears to support it. Subsequently, the paper (...) underscores some of the limitations of CMT, points to some philosophical problems that require further attention, and explores possible implications for understanding and treating of mental disorders. (shrink)

The current experiments examine mental health clinicians’ beliefs about biological, psychological, and environmental bases of the DSM‐IV‐TR mental disorders and the consequences of those causal beliefs for judging treatment effectiveness. Study 1 found a large negative correlation between clinicians’ beliefs about biological bases and environmental/psychological bases, suggesting that clinicians conceptualize mental disorders along a single continuum spanning from highly biological disorders (e.g., autistic disorder) to highly nonbiological disorders (e.g., adjustment disorders). Study 2 replicated this finding by (...) having clinicians list what they thought were the specific causes of nine familiar mental disorders and rate their bio–psycho–environmental bases. Study 3 further found that clinicians believe medication to be more effective for biologically based mental disorders and psychotherapy to be more effective for psychosocially based mental disorders. These results demonstrate that even expert mental health clinicians make strong distinctions between psychological and biological phenomena. (shrink)

Source [1] Andrew E. P. Mitchell, Federica Galli, Sondra Butterworth. (2023). Editorial: Equality, diversity and inclusive research for diverse rare disease communities. Front. Psychol., vol. 14. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1285774. "It is also important to recognize that certain mental health disorders are classified as rare conditions and have their own cultural concepts of distress, as defined in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)" and require “equal attention and support for individuals and their families, both physically and emotionally”. [1].

Ensuring well-being ahead of positive psychology aims at the treatment of individuals with psychological problems. Positive psychology contributes to the improvement of traumatic processes. But there is more to the field of study of positive psychology than that. In studies in this field, it has become important for individuals to be empowered with their own internal resources and to feel good with their values. The aim of this study is to determine the relationships between the concepts of psychological well-being and (...) consent. The main purpose of the concept of psychological well-being is to support the individual with its own values in a psychologically healthy life. These values strengthen individuals and contribute to mental health by helping regulate people's cognition, emotions and behaviours. Religion is full of values for a happy and peaceful life for the believers. Religious values have the potential to empower people, enhance their cognition, and provide psychological well-being. The concept of consent is contained many meanings such as; Accepting the result after making an effort to get what they want in life, being resilience against negative life events, being hopeful, being satisfied with the life he/she lives, to find inner peace, having good moral qualities and good morals. It has been determined that components such as acceptance of emotions arising from negative experiences, a meaningful life, life satisfaction, psychological resilience related to the concept of psychological well-being are included in the concept of consent among the religious concepts. In this paper, positive psychology and "consent", a religious concept, have been examined and suggested for positive psychology practices for individuals with faith in order to empower them with their own values. (shrink)

RESUMEN Las concepciones de salud mental son variadas y se han ido sucediendo de manera que cada una ha ido aportando nuevos matices a las anteriores, generando una nueva visión cada vez, donde las necesidades de la propia sociedad, han ido conformando una conceptualización de la salud mental de acuerdo con el contexto histórico, la disciplina y su modelación según las exigencias y particularidades de la sociedad y la cultura vigentes. Por consiguiente, se hace necesario replantear los conceptos (...) desde los que se interpreta la idea de salud mental, si guardan o no relación con definiciones universales o a concepciones construidas a partir de los diferentes planteamientos de salud-enfermedad. En consecuencia, es importante el aporte que se puede realizar desde la investigación para llegar a una construcción del concepto de Salud Mental que considere la multidisciplinariedad. Bajo esta perspectiva, se contextualiza el concepto de salud mental desde lo multidisciplinario. ABSTRACT There are several mental health conceptions which have been followed by others in such a way that each one of them has contributed to the previous ones, generating a different view each time, where the needs of society itself have made a conceptualization of mental health according to the historical context, discipline and model according to the requirements and particular features of society and the current culture. Therefore, it’s necessary to rethink the concepts from which the idea of mental health is interpreted, if it’s related to universal definitions or not, or to conceptions made from different approaches on health-disease. As a result, the contributions that can be made from research to achieve the construction of a multidisciplinary Mental Health concept are important. From this perspective, the concept of mental health is contextualized from a multidisciplinary point of view. (shrink)

Postpartum mood disorders develop shortly after childbirth in a significant proportion of women and have severe effects. Two evolutionary explanations are currently available. The first is that poor postpartum mental health is a consequence of an evolutionary trade-off – a compromise of neurological changes in the maternal brain during pregnancy which, on the one hand, maintain pregnancy, and on the other, increase the likelihood for postpartum women to develop psychopathology. The second explanation is that poor postpartum mental (...) health is a disease of civilization. This theoretical paper demonstrates that both explanations ignore the crucial event of childbirth. I elaborate on environmental features of childbirth, a physiological process that is substantially different in the current versus evolutionary childbirth and postpartum setting, and argue that maternal brain neuroplasticity and biochemical alterations are not an evolutionary trade-off, but an adaptation. Additionally, the incidents of poor postpartum mental health are better viewed as a maladaptation of the typical modern environments – an evolutionary mismatch. Thus, the potential to suffer from poor mental health in postpartum is an external, contingent happening, dependent on contemporary childbirth and postpartum environments, and not due to any essential property women possess as a result of evolutionary compromise. In fact, women are probably adapted to feel like superwomen right after birth, a state of mind that is an aid in adapting to motherhood. Distinguishing between evolutionary concepts in the context of pregnancy, birth, and motherhood is vital for developing more accurate preventions and interventions. (shrink)

How do people understand the concepts of mental health and disorder? The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of several factors on people’s judgments about whether a condition constitutes a mental disorder or a healthy state. Specifically, this study examines the impact of the source of the condition, its outcome, individual valuation (i.e., the value the individual attaches to the condition), and group valuation (i.e., the value the relevant group attaches to the condition). While (...) we find that people’s health and disorder judgments are driven by perceived dysfunction, we also find that health and disorder judgments are impacted differently by these factors. Health judgements are impacted by outcome and individual valuation, and disorder judgments are impacted by condition source. These results suggest that the folk concept of mental health is positive (i.e., mental health is more than the absence of mental disorder) and normativist (i.e., value judgments play a significant role in determining whether a condition counts as healthy), while the concept of mental disorder aligns with a naturalist perspective, at least to the extent that dysfunction plays an important role in categorizing a condition as a disorder. However, our finding that people’s dysfunction judgments are influenced by individual valuation and outcomes poses a strong challenge to naturalist accounts. To provide access to our supplementary data, an appendix has been included. (shrink)

Professionals within the mental health services face many ethical dilemmas and challenging situations regarding the use of coercion. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the significance of participating in systematic ethics reflection groups focusing on ethical challenges related to coercion. In 2013 and 2014, 20 focus group interviews with 127 participants were conducted. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. The analysis is inspired by the concept of ‘bricolage’ which means our approach was inductive. (...) Most participants report positive experiences with participating in ethics reflection groups: A systematic and well-structured approach to discuss ethical challenges, increased consciousness of formal and informal coercion, a possibility to challenge problematic concepts, attitudes and practices, improved professional competence and confidence, greater trust within the team, more constructive disagreement and room for internal critique, less judgmental reactions and more reasoned approaches, and identification of potential for improvement and alternative courses of action. On several wards, the participation of psychiatrists and psychologists in the reflection groups was missing. The impact of the perceived lack of safety in reflection groups should not be underestimated. Sometimes the method for ethics reflection was utilised in a rigid way. Direct involvement of patients and family was missing. This focus group study indicates the potential of ethics reflection groups to create a moral space in the workplace that promotes critical, reflective and collaborative moral deliberations. Future research, with other designs and methodologies, is needed to further investigate the impact of ethics reflection groups on improving health care practices. (shrink)

What is it to be mentally healthy? In the ongoing movement to promote mental health, to reduce stigma, and to establish parity between mental and physical health, there is a clear enthusiasm about this concept and a recognition of its value in human life. However, it is often unclear what mental health means in all these efforts and whether there is a single concept underlying them. Sometimes, the initiatives for the sake of (...) mental health are aimed just at reducing mental illness, thus implicitly identifying mental health with the absence of diagnosable psychiatric disease. More ambitiously, there are high-profile proposals to adopt a positive definition, identifying mental health with psychic or even overall well-being. We argue against both: a definition of mental health as mere absence of mental illness is too thin, too undemanding, and too closely linked to psychiatric value judgments, while the definition in terms of well-being is too demanding and potentially oppressive. As a compromise, we sketch out a middle position. On this view, mental health is a primary good, that is, the psychological preconditions of pursuing any conception of the good life, including well-being, without being identical to well-being. (shrink)

Marcus Tullius Cicero, the great promoter of Greek thought to the Latin world, gives a very detailed presentation of the Stoic philosophy of mind and of mental disorder in his Tusculan Disputations. In an interesting way, this philosophy anticipates the modern philosophical theories of affections or emotions developed by, for instance, R.M. Gordon, which are based on the concepts of belief and desire. According to Cicero, having an affection is the same as having a belief about something which one (...) considers to be good or evil, either in the present or in the future. Cicero develops these ideas about affections within the context of a theory of mental disorder, claiming that all but the mildest affections are in fact species of mental disorder. This paper summarizes Cicero's theory of affection and disorder and indicates its relations to modern thinking in the philosophy of emotion and mental health. (shrink)

BackgroundThe positive component of Mental Health Literacy refers to a person’s awareness of how to achieve and maintain good mental health. Although explored recently, the term still lacks a clear definition among healthcare practitioners.AimTo identify the attributes and characteristics of PMeHL, as well as its theoretical and practical applications.MethodsLiterature search and review, covering the last 21 years, followed by concept analysis according to the steps described by Walker and Avant approach.ResultsPositive component of Mental (...) class='Hi'>Health Literacy is considered one component of MHL, integrating positive mental health. The concept’s attributes include: competence in problem-solving and self-actualization; personal satisfaction; autonomy; relatedness and interpersonal relationship skills; self-control; and prosocial attitude. Four case scenarios were used to clarify the antecedents and consequences of PMeHL.ConclusionPositive component of Mental Health Literacy is considered a component of MHL, which deserves attention throughout the lifespan, in different contexts and intervention levels. Considering PMeHL as a multi-faceted and dynamic construct will help understand the mechanisms that improve mental health and promote healthy behaviors. Priority should be given to robust primary research focused on nursing interventions that enhance and sustain PMeHL in people and families. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of medical necessity as it relates to mental health care rationing, arguing that the normal functioning model of medical necessity is insufficient because it fails to cohere with an important aim and function of mental health care, which is to provide support for individuals in abusive or otherwise difficult personal relationships.

This is a brief comment on Christopher Megone's essay appearing in this issue. Cells, tissues, organs, and human beings qua biological organisms have natural functions, but human beings qua agents do not. Persons-in-society, unlike organs-in-bodies, are the products of culture, not simply of nature. Bodily disease is defined as a deviation from an objectively identifiable biological norm. The natural function of the kidney is to secrete urine; uremia is a literal disease. The social function of adults in American society includes (...) mingling with others in places away from home; "agoraphobia" may thus be called a metaphorical disease. In short, typhoid fever is a literal illness or disease; spring fever is a metaphorical illness or nondisease. Megone, however, rejects the claim that literal diseases "are physical disorders." Would he regard spring fever as a "real disease"? If not, why not? (shrink)

Mental health is a kind of emotional state, a good psychological state can have a positive impact on a person, physical exercise can have a positive impact on the psychological state of college students, prevent the generation of negative emotions, improve the bad emotional state, and then promote the mental health of college students. Health is an inevitable requirement to promote the all-round development of people and a basic condition for economic and social development. (...) class='Hi'>Health education should be incorporated into the national education system to promote the national health of the people through sports. Young people are the main force and backbone of national and social development. In order to realize the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation, we must attach importance to the development of young people and the physical and mental health of young people. In the process of compulsory education, middle school and high school period is a key stage in the gradual formation and development of students' psychology and body, but due to the large audience of China's education, the competition is more intense, which inevitably causes a lot of students to focus on exam-oriented education and neglect physical health, especially in recent years, the mental health issues of increasing concern. Through the research situation of mental health in China and the concept of mental health quality, this paper analyzes the problems of sports and mental health, and puts forward some corresponding suggestions for the problems, which has reference significance for promoting students' mental health. (shrink)

In order to improve early childhood physical education, in this study, the talent cultivation mechanism for undergraduates was explored under the “full-practice” concept, oriented by preschooler mental health. First, from the perspective of preschooler psychology, the mechanisms of ability training and talent cultivation for undergraduates majoring in early childhood education were explored under the “full-practice” concept. Considering that the physical, psychological, and intellectual development of preschoolers shall follow the rules of physical education, and current early childhood (...) education mainly focuses on intelligence education in China, early childhood physical education was analyzed further in this study. By investigating the undergraduate majors of early childhood education in Henan University, this study first summarized the current problems in early childhood education systems in universities. Secondly, combined with the form of physical education in kindergartens, strategies for talent cultivation and curriculum setting of early childhood physical education majors in colleges and universities were proposed. Finally, from the perspective of innovation and diversification of training forms, the cultivation of early childhood educators’ physical education ability was analyzed at multiple levels and multiple objectives, and the integrated training system of early childhood education talents was constructed. The results show that, among all the courses for early childhood education major, compulsory courses account for 81.2% and optional courses account for 18.8%. In addition, a survey on undergraduates’ attitudes toward the curriculum of their major demonstrates that 81.2% of the undergraduates thought that the range and content of practical courses should be increased, indicating that undergraduates majoring in early childhood education are dissatisfied with the current curriculum system, and they have an increased demand for practical courses. Correspondingly, it is vital to build and improve on the early childhood physical education. In terms of its talent cultivation, the “full-practice” concept helps combine theory with practice to improve the effectiveness of education and teaching, pushing forward the reform of the education system. Meanwhile, data- and intelligence-oriented teaching will become the new direction of modern sports development, as well as an important link for tracking and monitoring children’s sports teaching in China. Through the continuous introduction of wearable artificial intelligence products, real-time monitoring of children’s physical conditions can be realized, which helps improve the effectiveness of early childhood physical education. (shrink)

Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health: The Need to Look Elsewhere for Standards of Good Mental Health is the first book to question the equation of psychological normality and mental health. It is also the first book to take contemporary psychiatry and clinical psychology to task for deeply flawed thinking when they accept the diagnostic system propounded by the DSM, which reifies syndromes into alleged “mental disorders.” Where Thomas Szasz argued that “mental (...) disorders” are myths, Bartlett makes the much more damaging charge that reifying mental disorders involves a provable form of fallacious thinking, producing a variety of epistemological nonsense. /// -/- -/- The author weighs the evidence, and with strict logic, compelling evidence, and careful analysis, challenges the current paradigm of mental health theorists and practitioners. Never has the case against the standard of psychological normality and against the non-scientific creation of “mental disorders” been made with such boldness, multidisciplinary knowledge, solid scholarship, and clarity of language. /// -/- -/- Normality Does Not Equal Mental HealthAlthough the need to question psychological normality as a satisfactory standard of good mental health has been staring us in the face for a long time, no one, clinical professional or scholar, has had the courage or the intellectual willingness to face with unflinching honesty the shortcomings and disappointments of psychological normality and to propose that we should look elsewhere for standards of good psychological health. /// -/- -/- Contemporary psychiatry and clinical psychology, on the contrary, base their conception of mental health on the standard of psychological normality. This supposition has come to be accepted uncritically and without question, and yet it has become fundamental to current clinical theory and practice, and forms the core of the psychiatric classification system of the DSM, which has become today’s diagnostic authority. /// -/- -/- While touting today’s scientific gold standard of “evidence-based” research, DSM’s authoritative classification of “mental disorders” is itself hardly “evidence-based,” for it is recognized, but seldom emphasized, that the majority of DSM’s “mental disorders” have no known empirical, organic basis. /// -/- -/- Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health takes DSM to task not only for its failure to adhere to today’s evidence-based standard, but for its failure to rein in its highly speculative diagnostic labeling, in accordance with the modern paradigm of rigorous science, which repudiates metaphorical reifications whose alleged validity rests only on the voting preferences of a professional membership. /// -/- -/- The book is a carefully argued critique of the dominant assumption in current psychiatry and clinical psychology that psychological normality is fundamental to mental health and therefore good. In place of this unsatisfactory presumption, Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health proposes a positive and constructive revision in our understanding of mental health and of our conception of mental disorders. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a new way to understand the integration of facts and values in the concept of mental disorder that has the potential to avoid the flaws of previous hybrid approaches. I import conceptual tools from the account of procedural objectivity defended by Helen Longino to resolve the controversy over the definition of mental disorder. My argument is threefold: I first sketch the history of the debate opposing objectivists and constructivists and focus on (...) the criticisms that led to the emergence of the debate. Second, I offer a reconstruction of the “Natural Function Approach” argument to make explicit an unsound assumption underlying this approach. The reconstruction will allow me to show that the NFO’s argument depends on the ideal of value-free science that I will criticize. Then I propose an alternative ideal for psychiatry: social objectivity. I argue that the concept of mental health should be seen as “socially objective” rather than value-free, moving the debate towards the social procedures by which the definition is produced rather than the normative and factual content of its definition. (shrink)

Nurses working in correctional and forensic mental health settings face unique challenges in the provision of care to patients within custodial settings. The subjectivities of both patients and nurses are subject to the power relations, discourses and abjection encountered within these practice milieus. Using a poststructuralist approach using the work of Foucault, Kristeva, and Deleuze and Guattari, this paper explores how both patient and nurse subjectivities are produced within the carceral logic of this apparatus of capture. Recognizing that (...) subjectivities are fluid and dynamic, and capable of change, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of deterritorialization will illustrate opportunities for resistance, where nurses can begin to practice outside the dominant carceral logic (and restrictions) of the system. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (...) (ethical) discussion of AI in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)

In my paper, I propose to investigate the philosophical underpinnings of representative indigenous Japanese psychotherapeutic approaches, particularly that of Morita and Naikan therapies, that have, at their foundations, distinctly Buddhist psychological tenets, and that offer to deal with mental health issues in a manifestly different way compared with their western counterparts. I offer a comprehensive account of how the characterizations of madness and mental illness have been shifting over the last two hundred years in Japanese society and (...) culture, and how this has affected mental health care in Japan. Finally, the ways in which modern day thinkers, such as Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki and Keiji Nishitani have been re-shaping the concepts of the self in Japanese religion and philosophy while, at the same time, taking care to remain faithful to the original East Asian sensibilities will also be expounded and connected to the themes of mental health and mental illness. (shrink)

The impetus driving this article is the uncritical uses of ‘culture’ as an explanatory variable in public health research of ‘suicide’, regarding its conceptualization and operationalization as a mentally riddled phenomenon clamped in nomothetic and epidemiological nomenclature. This reduction of suicide to its presumed ‘evidence based’ figures and graphs under the guise of the lingo of culture requires and yields not only ‘thin’ understandings but also non-committal conclusions. Thus, ‘culture’ merely appears as a ‘thing’ made of shared norms and (...) values that arguably can be measured, computed, and even predicted in relation to tables of suicide rates. With the aim of critically un-disciplining and unleashing these two intersecting fuzzy concepts from the straits of their epistemological habitus, we set an alternative scene of relations between them that contribute to the re-conceptualization of both. ‘Suicide cultures’, a term we coined for highlighting temporal, agentive, performative, and social justice questions of suicide and culture, place the preoccupation with mortality and terminality at its core. This turn in the analysis of public health sheds a non-perfunctory light on the cultural parameters of counting of and accounting for the incidence of suicide in different social settings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narrative Formulation RevisitedOn Seeing the Person in Mental Health RecoveryAnna Bergqvist (bio)The use of narrative in mental health contexts models consciousness as something necessarily embodied, as already part of the world, in an inherently value-laden and perspectival way. As such narrative presents a powerful tool for critical reassessment and reevaluation of preconceived ideas in relating to difficult concepts in clinical interactions.Narrative structures can reveal psychological (...) differences between persons in a way that matters for the provision of effective treatment and management. As emphasized by Solomon (2015), narrative reasoning is also motivated by distinctly first-personal concerns that are operative in the practitioner–client relationship. I maintain that the dynamics of that interpersonal relationship are part and parcel of what it means to address the patient's needs to be seen as a person in humanistic empathetic care—without thereby reducing truth to an individual person's perspective to encourage positive transformation.1The notion of empowering narratives to encourage positive change is a core concept behind the emphasis on the critical role of empathy in explaining human development and psychoanalytic change within the self-psychology tradition but is also key to recovery-based models of the significance of person-centered quality of life in medicine more generally. This is defined in mental health as recovering a good quality of life as determined by the values of (by what matters or is important to) the individual concerned (Allott, Loganathan, & Fulford, 2002; Fulford, 1989, 2004; Fulford, Peile, & Carroll, 2012). The importance of strengths in this regard was reflected for example in the UK government program on values-based mental health assessment. The 3 Keys program, as it was called (National Institute for Mental Health in England, NIMHE, and the Care Services Improvement Partnership, 20082) identified three shared 'keys' to good practice in mental health assessment: three things that were identified in a wide-ranging consultation as being important alike by health professionals of all kinds and by 'service users' thus understood as patients and carers (Fulford, Duhig, Hankin, Hicks, & Keeble, 2015a; Fulford, Dewey, & King, 2015b). The third of these keys was defined in [End Page 7] the subsequently published Good Practice Guidance, as "a person-centred focus that builds on the strengths, resiliencies and aspirations of the individual service user as well as identifying his or her needs and challenges" (NIMHE, 2008: 6); and the guidance included a number of real-life case examples of best recovery practice reflecting this aspect of mental health care (Slade et al., 2014).What my (Bergqvist, 2018, 2020, 2022, forthcoming) account adds to this claim is that while such choices are revelatory or expressive of a distinctly first-personal stance, they do not constitute or determine selfhood and self-interpretation in a fixed way. Moreover, the reason is that one can also adopt a second-personal stance on one's own experience and address oneself, where the relationship between the first- and the second-personal narrative perspective on experience and self-understanding is itself a dynamic and open-ended evaluative process.Anna Bergqvist Anna Bergqvist is Reader in Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University since 2021, and has been Postgraduate Research Coordinator and AHRC North West Doctoral Pathway Consortium Lead for Philosophy since 2020. I was elected to a Visiting Fellowship at St Catherine's College University of Oxford for Michaelmas Term 2021. Her service to the profession out with the University includes acting as Secretary of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) Section for Philosophy & Humanities in Psychiatry (October 2020 – present), Executive Committee Member of the Royal College of Psychiatry (RCPsych) SIG in Philosophy (February 2020 – present) and External Examiner, University of Liverpool (November 2019 – present, 4-year tenure). She is also Director of the Values-based Theory Network at St Catherine's Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice at the University of Oxford, and Member of its Whiteness and Race Equality Network. Her approach to philosophy bridges the disciplines of moral philosophy, moral psychology and philosophy of psychiatry to improve lives through her reputable expertise in moral perception and co-production as a mechanism for change.Notes1. Here I side with Goldie (2012) and Solomon (2015), who... (shrink)

In this paper we set out the context in which experiences of mental distress occur with an emphasis on the contributions of social and structural factors and then make a case for the use of intersectionality as an analytic and methodological framework for understanding these factors. We then turn to the political urgency for taking up the concept of recovery and argue for the importance of research and practice that addresses professional domination of the field, and that promotes (...) ongoing engagement and dialogue about recovery as both a personal and social experience. To this end, we describe a unique project that sought to deepen our understanding of how recovery is being thought about and applied in the current context of mental health care in Vancouver, BC, with a specific focus on how, and whether, people are taking up and addressing dimensions of power that we see as critical to the operationalization of recovery within a social justice framework. Emerging from our research and discussion is a set of critical questions about whether or not the political moment in Canada with respect to re-invigorating recovery should be embraced, versus a rejection of the concept of recovery as too limiting in its scope and too vulnerable to professional co-optation. (shrink)

Trust and trustworthiness are essential for good healthcare, especially in mental healthcare. New technologies, such as mobile health apps, can affect trust relationships. In mental health, some apps need the trust of their users for therapeutic efficacy and explicitly ask for it, for example, through an avatar. Suppose an artificial character in an app delivers healthcare. In that case, the following questions arise: Whom does the user direct their trust to? Whether and when can an avatar (...) be considered trustworthy? Our study aims to analyze different dimensions of trustworthiness in the context of mobile health app use. We integrate O'Neill's account of autonomy, trust, and trustworthiness into a model of trustworthiness as a relational concept with four relata: B is trustworthy with respect to A regarding the performance of Z because of C. Together with O'Neill's criteria of trustworthiness (honesty, competence, and reliability), this four-sided model is used to analyze different dimensions of trustworthiness in an exemplary case of mobile health app use. Our example focuses on an app that uses an avatar and is intended to treat sleep difficulties. The conceptual analysis shows that interpreting trust and trustworthiness in health app use is multi-layered and involves a net of interwoven universal obligations. At the same time, O'Neill's approach to autonomy, trust, and trustworthiness offers a normative account to structure and analyze these complex relations of trust and trustworthiness using mobile health apps. (shrink)

On the grounds of the fundamental value of the human rights, which is the human dignity, this article describes a basis of the right to health care in terms of quality, discloses its concept, reviews the spheres of health system in which this right is exercised: health care and public health. The right to health care is stressed as one of the fundamental rights, without which the person will not able to enjoy other rights: (...) economic, political and social rights. It comprises the right to enjoy the best physical and mental health. The right to health care is not absolute in itself: efficiency of its implementation depends upon both ability of administrative and institutional systems, which were created by the state, to properly implement the assigned functions and upon the individual, its state of health and lifestyle. (shrink)

Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics identify mental health with moral virtue. Are they right? We might be inclined to disagree with him if we believe that mental health is good for the agent, whereas virtues of character are good for other people. These philosophers answer that the mental features of the virtues of character are also features of a person's good. Still, their demands for psychic unity and cohesion might appear to exaggerate reasonable conditions on (...) mental health. In the view of these philosophers, our conception of mental health should make us aware of the aspects of agency that we value. We do not refer to different characteristics when we think of mental health and when we think of moral virtue. The main question is not about whether we choose to confine the expression "mental health" to the minimal condition, but about what makes the minimal condition valuable. It turns out to be difficult to explain why the minimal condition is valuable without also endorsing the moral virtues. (shrink)

The concept 'health' is ambiguous [18,9, 11]. The concept 'mental health' is even more so. 'Health' compasses senses of well-being, wholeness, and sound ness that mean more than the simple freedom from illness - a fact appreci ated in the World Health Organization's definition of health as more than the absence of disease or infirmity [7]. The wide range of viewpoints of the con tributors to this volume attests to the scope of (...) issues placed under the rubric 'mental health. ' These papers, presented at the Fourth Symposium on Philos ophy and Medicine, were written and discussed within a broad context of interests concerning mental health. Moreover, in their diversity these papers point to the many descriptive, evaluative, and, in fact, performative functions of statements concerning mental health. Before introducing the substance of these papers in any detail, I want to indicate the profound commerce between philosophical and psychological ideas in theories of mental health and disease. This will be done in part by a consideration of some conceptual developments in the history of psychiatry, as well as through an analysis of some of the functions of the notions of mental illness and health. 'Mental health' lays a special stress on the wholeness of human intuition, emotion, thought, and action. (shrink)